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RECALIBRATING THE SCALES: 
BALANCING THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
Abstract: Just as U.S. asylum law accepts individuals fleeing persecution, it also 
excludes from eligibility those who have assisted or otherwise participated in the 
persecution of others under what is known as the “persecutor bar.” In applying 
the persecutor bar, courts look to whether the applicant’s conduct played any 
causal role in the persecution, whether the applicant knew that his conduct would 
have some causal effect on the persecution, and whether the conduct was volun-
tary. Because exclusionary provisions to asylum such as the persecutor bar are to 
be applied restrictively, U.S. jurisprudence wrongly ignores other key factors that 
are necessary in assessing the application of the persecutor bar. After surveying 
both domestic and international critiques of U.S. asylum law, this Note argues 
that courts applying the persecutor bar should employ a balancing test that 
weighs the persecution from which the applicant is fleeing against the gravity of 
the applicant’s conduct, the nature of the persecution in which the applicant as-
sisted, and any other mitigating factors such as the time elapsed since the appli-
cant’s conduct or any redemptive acts performed by the applicant. 
INTRODUCTION 
Daniel Negusie, a dual citizen of Ethiopia and Eritrea, arrived on the 
United States shore after traveling hidden on a ship departing from Africa.1 He 
fled after a torturous decade in his war-ridden country.2 He had been impris-
oned, beaten with sticks, and held without shelter in extreme heat.3 His crime: 
refusing to take arms on behalf of Eritrea against Ethiopia.4 Asylum denied.5 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 514–15 (2009). 
 2 See id. (noting that the applicant was first captured and forced into conscription by the Eritrean 
military in 1994, imprisoned from 1998 to 2000 by the Eritrean government for refusing to fight, and 
again forced to serve in the Eritrean military until 2004 before fleeing to the United States). The war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea over competing territorial claims killed an estimated one hundred thou-
sand people and displaced one million. See Patrick Gilkes & Tom Barry, The War Between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Oct. 11, 2005), https://ips-dc.org/the_war_between_ethiopia_
and_eritrea/ [https://perma.cc/TT5X-NYKQ] (explaining that the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
from 1998 to 2000 was over claims of “‘national pride’ and ‘territorial integrity’”). 
 3 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 515 (discussing the abusive tactics employed by the Eritrean government 
against the applicant). 
 4 Id. at 514–15. 
 5 Id. at 515–16 (providing the procedural history of the applicant’s asylum claim). Negusie’s 
application for asylum was first denied by the immigration judge because the applicant engaged in the 
persecution of others. Id. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit both affirmed the determination. Id. The BIA “is the highest administrative body” 
regarding immigration law and is responsible for hearing appeals from decisions made by immigration 
judges. Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-
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Prior to escaping from Eritrea and after spending two years incarcerated, 
Negusie finally agreed to work as a prison guard for the Eritrean Army where 
he performed minimal duties, never personally punished anyone, and often 
provided aid to prisoners.6 In the initial asylum application, the U.S. Immigra-
tion Judge found it likely that Negusie would be tortured if sent back to Eri-
trea.7 The judge even admitted that he was not a malicious or aggressive per-
son.8 Nevertheless, Daniel Negusie was denied asylum because the judge de-
termined that Negusie had assisted in persecution.9 Under U.S. law, any person 
unable or unwilling to return to their home country due to fear of persecution 
“on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion” is eligible to apply for asylum.10 Asylum law re-
tracts eligibility, however, if the judge finds that an applicant played any role in 
persecution, in a provision known as “the persecutor bar.”11 
Negusie appealed the immigration judge’s decision to the Supreme Court, 
which remanded the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to 
decide whether an applicant could be barred from asylum if he was coerced 
into performing the persecutory actions.12 After nine years of deliberation, in 
2018, the BIA set a new precedent by ruling that, in limited circumstances, 
asylum may be granted to an individual who committed persecutory acts under 
                                                                                                                           
immigration-appeals [https://perma.cc/GW8B-A5QV] (summarizing the responsibilities and authority 
of the BIA). 
 6 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 515 (discussing the applicant’s testimony in which he admitted to 
performing guard duties for the Eritrean Army for four years on rotation, but also that he never direct-
ly participated in any abusive conduct towards the prisoners and helped various prisoners). 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. (noting that the immigration judge found no evidence that the applicant was a “malicious 
person or . . . aggressive person who mistreated the prisoners”). 
 9 Id. at 515–16 (holding that the applicant was statutorily barred from receiving asylum due to his 
participation “in the persecution of others”). Under U.S. law, individuals are deemed ineligible for 
asylum if they are found to have “participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Infra note 11 
(providing the statutory language of the “persecutor bar”). 
 10 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2018) (providing the Secretary of Homeland Security or the 
Attorney General the authority to grant asylum to anyone who is determined to be a refugee as defined 
by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)); see also id. § 1101(a)(42) (defining refugee as “any person who is outside 
any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside 
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, 
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of per-
secution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion”). 
 11 See id. § 1101(a)(42) (“The term ‘refugee’ does not include any person who ordered, incited, 
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”). 
 12 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 524–25 (remanding the case to the BIA to determine whether to adopt 
a standard that considers the “voluntariness” of the applicant’s conduct when applying the persecutor 
bar). 
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duress.13 Under the narrow test employed by the BIA, however, Negusie was 
still barred.14 
Whereas asylum law provides a haven to individuals found to have a 
credible fear of persecution in their home country, the persecutor bar acts as 
the other side of the coin, prohibiting individuals found culpable for such per-
secution from being granted relief.15 Upon judicial review, the circuit courts 
have been tasked with drawing the line to determine what level of conduct 
constitutes assistance or participation in persecution so as to trigger the perse-
cutor bar.16 
By recognizing a limited duress defense to the persecutor bar in Matter of 
Negusie I, the BIA acknowledged that the subjective intent of the applicant 
should be considered.17 The BIA’s analysis, however, stops short of undertak-
ing a comprehensive review of the applicant’s circumstances.18 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Matter of Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 363 (B.I.A. 2018) (Matter of Negusie I) (holding that 
an applicant must satisfy all elements of a five-prong test before being able to present a duress defense 
to the persecutor bar). As part of his overhaul of U.S. immigration law, former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions stayed the BIA’s decision and invited parties to submit amicus briefs on the question of 
“[w]hether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the . . . persecutor bar.” Matter of 
Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481, 481 (A.G. 2018) (Matter of Negusie II). See also Sari Horwitz, Ses-
sions, Pressing Trump’s Agenda, Seeks ‘Merit-Based’ Immigration, End to ‘Sanctuary’ Cities, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/sessions-pressing-
trumps-agenda-seeks-merit-based-immigration-end-to-sanctuary-cities/2018/01/26/1c1db4ca-02c4-
11e8-8acf-ad2991367d9d_story.html [https://perma.cc/P5L3-9WMP] (noting that former Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions called for an “overhaul of the nation’s ‘lax’ immigration system for immigrants 
here legally and illegally”).  
 14 Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 368 (holding that Negusie did not meet the five-prong 
test for duress because the alleged death threats he received did not meet the level of harm required for 
a duress defense and he had a reasonable chance to escape from the prison). 
 15 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 535 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that 
the statutory context and legislative history of the persecutor bar demonstrates Congress’s intent to 
use it to indicate culpability); Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 55 (1971) (noting that one 
of the goals of asylum law is to create “a haven for the world’s homeless people”). 
 16 See Stanojkova v. Holder, 645 F.3d 943, 948–49 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that the circuit courts 
carry the burden of distinguishing between conduct that constitutes assistance in persecution from less 
culpable conduct); Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 112, 133–34 (1st Cir. 2006) (collecting 
cases from the First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits). If the BIA denies an asylum claim, 
the applicant may seek judicial review in the U.S. Court of Appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (grant-
ing U.S. appeals courts with jurisdiction to “review final orders of removal”); Abdisalan v. Holder, 
774 F.3d 517, 523 (9th Cir. 2014) (confirming that circuit courts have jurisdiction to review final 
orders of removal issued by the immigration judge). 
 17 See Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 348 (recognizing that the state of mind of an indi-
vidual forced to carry out persecutory acts is germane to the persecutor bar determination). 
 18 See id. at 363–64 (providing a five-part test to assess an applicant’s duress defense which does 
not include an assessment of the situation the applicant is fleeing from, any redemptive acts taken by 
the applicant, or the severity of the persecution in which the applicant allegedly assisted); see also 
infra Part III (proposing the implementation of a balancing test when applying the persecutor bar in 
order to provide for a more comprehensive review of the applicant’s circumstances). 
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This Note argues that in applying the persecutor bar, courts should bal-
ance the severity of the applicant’s conduct with the persecution the applicant 
is fleeing from, the nature of the persecution in which the applicant assisted, as 
well as any mitigating factors such as any redemptive acts and the time elapsed 
since the applicant’s persecutory conduct.19 Part I of this Note provides an 
overview of asylum law and the persecutor bar as well as a focused study of its 
application to those involved in carrying out China’s one-child policy.20 Part II 
discusses various domestic and international critiques of the rigid nature of 
U.S. immigration law and its application of the persecutor bar.21 Part III argues 
that in order to assess asylum claims with concern for human rights, courts 
should conduct a balancing test when applying the persecutor bar.22 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
The law of asylum in the United States is an evolving doctrine, constantly 
adjusting to account for the circumstances of countries and the people that live 
in them.23 In addition to allowing those fleeing persecution into the country, 
asylum laws also keep those responsible for persecuting others out of the coun-
try through application of the persecutor bar.24 Section A of this Part provides a 
brief history of asylum law in the United States.25 Section B discusses the ori-
gins of the persecutor bar and the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on the mat-
ter.26 Section C discusses various interpretations circuit courts have made in 
applying the persecutor bar.27 Section D, in order to demonstrate the persecutor 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See infra notes 23–213 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 23–114 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 115–186 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 187–213 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that beginning 
with the aftermath of World War II, the United States has yet to produce a concrete approach to defin-
ing refugee); Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agenda for the 
Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 63 (1993) (noting that asylum law is intended to 
cover an “endless variety of situations”). See generally 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION 
LAW & PROCEDURE § 33.04 (2018) (stating that by leaving the term persecution undefined in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the definition of refugee has evolved through the courts over 
time). Enacted in 1952 and codified under Title 8 of the U.S. Code, the INA is the primary federal 
statute governing immigration and citizenship in the United States. See 82 Cong. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 
163, 163 (stating that the purpose of the INA is to “revise the laws relating to immigration, naturaliza-
tion, and nationality”); Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (July 
10, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/legal-resources/immigration-and-nationality-act [https://perma.cc/
6WBK-V7KH] (discussing how the INA “contains many of the most important provisions of immi-
gration law”). 
 24 See Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97 (B.I.A. 1984) (stating that by barring from 
asylum those who have persecuted others, U.S. asylum law signals that those who have persecuted 
others are “unworthy and not deserving of international protection”). 
 25 See infra notes 29–38 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 39–66 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 67–87 and accompanying text. 
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bar’s effect on a specific population, delves into the application of the bar to 
individuals indirectly involved in carrying out China’s one-child policy.28 
A. A Brief History of U.S. Asylum Law 
Throughout its history, the United States has always provided safe harbor 
to certain foreign persons.29 Nevertheless, without a distinct legal status for 
noncitizens fleeing persecution, the United States denied refuge to thousands 
of displaced Jews and other victims of the Nazi regime during World War II.30 
Following the war, as part of the international movement towards recognizing 
human rights as a global issue, the United Nations sought to remedy this injus-
tice by providing a comprehensive definition of refugee as well as a set of re-
sponsibilities for nations in granting asylum.31 The United Nations 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), later 
amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Proto-
col), defined refugee as a person who fears persecution on account of his or her 
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.32 In harmony with the international community, as part of the Refugee 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 88–114 and accompanying text. Though China officially implemented a two-
child policy in place of its one-child policy in 2016, the one-child policy and its impact on U.S. asy-
lum law demonstrate the collateral effects that result from the recognition of new forms of persecu-
tion. See Wang Feng et al., The End of China’s One-Child Policy, 47 STUD. FAM. PLAN., 83, 83 
(2016) (“Starting on January 1, 2016, all Chinese couples are allowed to have two children.”). 
 29 See THOMAS ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP PROCESS AND POLICY 793 
(8th ed. 2016) (noting that in 1875, when first deciding to exclude former criminals from admission 
into the United States, Congress made an exemption for those “who had been convicted of political 
offenses”); see also An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration (Page Act), 43 
Cong. Ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (exempting convicts of political offenses from the exclusion of alien 
convicts). 
 30 See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that by refus-
ing refuge to persons escaping Germany and the surrounding countries, “[t]he response of the Allies 
was shameful”); Dara Lind, How America’s Rejection of Jews Fleeing Nazi Germany Haunts Our 
Refugee Policy Today, VOX (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/1/27/
14412082/refugees-history-holocaust [https://perma.cc/P5WU-EMCH] (noting that during World War 
II, the United States rejected entry of nine hundred German Jews who arrived on a ship, and later 
denied a proposition that would grant refuge to twenty thousand Jewish children). 
 31 See DONNELLY, supra note 30, at 4 (stating that the Holocaust was the unfortunate trigger that 
made human rights a global issue); Stephen Meili, U.K. Refugee Lawyers: Pushing the Boundaries of 
Domestic Court Acceptance of International Human Rights Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1124 (2013) 
(stating that international treaties such as the 1951 Refugee Convention created global standards re-
garding the admission and exclusion of refugees); Refugees, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/
en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/ [https://perma.cc/M6ZG-DUJH] (noting that the United Nations 
created an agency specifically designed to help refugees following World War II and to provide a 
legal framework for helping refugees). 
 32 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A), 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150, 152 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention] (providing that the term refugee applies to 
anyone who “as a result of events occurring before [January 1,] 1951 and owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
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Act of 1980, which made various amendments to the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act of 1952 (INA), the United States aligned its definition of refugee with 
that of the 1951 Refugee Convention while further expanding it to include vic-
tims of past persecution.33 
Though first statutorily defined by Congress in response to the blatant 
horrors of World War II, the term refugee is not limited to persons fleeing gen-
ocide.34 In contrast, because of the many different forms persecution has taken 
and the indefinite forms of persecution the future may hold, the ambiguity of 
                                                                                                                           
or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country”). Whereas the 1951 Refugee Convention 
only covered persons fleeing persecution occurring in Europe before January 1, 1951, the 1967 Proto-
col removed these limitations. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol] (omitting the geographic and temporal 
restrictions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, thereby expanding the definition of refugee). 
 33 Compare Refugee Act of 1980, § 201, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.) [hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980] (amending the definition of refugee to be, gener-
ally, any person who has a “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”), with 1951 Refugee Convention, 189 
U.N.T.S. at 152 (defining refugee as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is out-
side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”). 
Though the United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol, it is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion. See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING 
TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/
3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5YD-3VDZ] (listing the parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the United Na-
tions agency created to assist and protect refugees. See generally History of UNHCR, UNHCR, 
https://www.unhcr.org/history-of-unhcr.html [https://perma.cc/ESC7-V5JV] (outlining the background 
and activities of the UNHCR). In addition to offering safe harbor, asylum in the United States comes 
with various coveted immigration benefits and securities including a pathway to citizenship. See Benefits 
and Responsibilities of Asylees, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., https://www.uscis.
gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/benefits-and-responsibilities-asylees [https://perma.cc/DT3M-
54WW] (summarizing the various benefits associated with being granted asylum including work authori-
zation, access to a social security card, ability to request asylum status for spouses or children, and eligi-
bility to apply for permanent residence after one year in the United States). Whereas a refugee is defined 
as a person outside of his or her country who fears persecution in his or her home country, an asylee is a 
person already in the United States or seeking admission to the United States at a port of entry who meets 
the statutory definition of refugee. Refugees and Asylees, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.
dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/refugees-asylees [https://perma.cc/VB6A-PSAM] (distinguishing defini-
tion of refugee from asylee). 
 34 See GORDON ET AL., supra note 23, § 33.04 (noting that “persecution has come to include a 
wide variety of acts, from the most egregious, such as imprisonment and severe forms of torture, to 
the less harmful, such as abuse and confiscation of property”); Refugees, supra note 31 (noting that the 
United Nations created an agency specifically tailored to assist refugees in the aftermath of World 
War II); see also, e.g., Tian-Yong Chen v. INS, 359 F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that appli-
cants who suffered physical harm arising from their religious beliefs may establish past persecution); 
Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that, to be considered persecution, while the 
applicant’s conduct “need not necessarily threaten the petitioner’s ‘life or freedom,’ it must rise above 
the level of mere ‘harassment’”). 
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the term allows court interpretation of conduct constituting persecution to 
change over time.35 As a result, the definition of refugee is fluid and sufficient-
ly malleable to protect an array of persons fleeing from different types of per-
secution.36 Over the years, the courts have recognized certain groups of people 
as deserving protection under asylum laws such as victims of mandatory fe-
male genital mutilation in Togo and homosexuals in Cuba punished on account 
of their sexual orientation.37 Other groups, such as victims of a coercive popu-
lation control program like China’s one-child policy, have been recognized as 
eligible for asylum by statute.38 
B. The Persecutor Bar 
Under the INA’s “persecutor bar,” a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum if 
he or she “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”39 Replicating the language used 
to define refugee under the INA, the persecutor bar ensures that individuals 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 2005) (suggesting that the notion of per-
secution tends to change frequently and therefore is left undefined by statute); see, e.g., Matter of A-
B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (vacating the BIA’s grant of asylum to the victim of domes-
tic abuse and finding that, in future proceedings, victims of “domestic violence or gang violence per-
petrated by non-governmental actors will not [generally] qualify for asylum”). 
 36 See Topalli v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 128, 132 (1st Cir. 2005) (“Due to the infinite variety of fac-
tual circumstances the BIA is likely to face, the BIA has preferred to decide what amounts to past 
persecution on a case-by-case basis, instead of announcing rigid rules embodying some precise calcu-
lus of maltreatment and suffering.”). With the impending threat of countries becoming uninhabitable 
due to climate change, many scholars argue that asylum eligibility must be extended to so-called “cli-
mate change refugees.” See generally Bonnie Docherty & Tyler Giannini, Confronting a Rising Tide: 
A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change Refugees, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 349, 393 
(2009) (identifying advocates for granting refugee status to those who suffer from environmental 
harm). 
 37 See, e.g., In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (B.I.A. 1996) (recognizing the status of 
being an uncircumcised woman as a characteristic one “should not be required to change,” thereby 
declaring that persons being persecuted on account of mandatory female genital mutilation are eligible 
for asylum); Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 820–22 (B.I.A. 1990) (recognizing sex-
ual orientation as an “‘immutable’ characteristic,” and thus protecting certain persons being persecut-
ed on account of homosexuality as eligible for asylum). 
 38 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018) (specifically recognizing that for purposes of defining refu-
gee, “a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or 
who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a 
coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political 
opinion”). The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), passed in 
1996, amended the definition of refugee in the INA by adding language to clarify that victims of “a 
coercive population control program” are eligible for asylum as victims of persecution “on account of 
political opinion.” See infra note 91 and accompanying text (providing language added to the defini-
tion of refugee to include victims of coercive population control programs). 
 39 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); see also Negusie, 555 U.S. at 514 (referring to the relevant section 
of the INA as the “so-called ‘persecutor bar’”). 
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responsible for any recognized form of persecution are denied refugee status.40 
The persecutor bar is thus one way to limit asylum to only those who the Unit-
ed States deems are worthy of protection.41 
The first form of the persecutor bar in U.S. law appeared in the now de-
funct Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), which was passed primarily to 
allow European refugees of World War II to emigrate to the United States.42 
The DPA also contained language that specifically excluded from admission 
participants in any movement hostile to the United States and anyone who ad-
vocated or assisted in the persecution of others because of their race, religion, 
or national origin.43 It was not until the Refugee Act of 1980, which estab-
lished the five protected grounds for granting asylum status still recognized 
today, that Congress expanded the persecutor bar to disallow asylum status to 
anyone who had persecuted others on account of one of the five protected 
grounds.44 Whereas the DPA was enacted specifically to address the Holocaust 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (limiting refugees to those who are fleeing their home country 
due to “persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 
or political opinion”), with id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (applying the persecution exception to all asylum 
applicants who “ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion”).  
 41 See id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(i–vi), (B)(i) (listing additional exceptions to asylum eligibility); Ne-
gusie, 555 U.S. at 526–27 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that an overarching concern in determining 
admissibility of noncitizens is “desirability”).  
 42 See generally Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA), Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 [here-
inafter DPA] (amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (codified as amend-
ed at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1951–1965 (1951)) (no longer in force)) (stating that the purpose of the DPA 
was to “authorize for a limited period of time the admission into the United States of certain European 
displaced persons for permanent residence”); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981) 
(explaining that Congress’s principal purpose in enacting the DPA was to provide haven to Europeans 
fleeing persecution after World War II). The DPA adopted the definition of “displaced person” from 
Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), the intergovernmental 
organization created to address the surge of refugees following World War II, which defined refugee 
as a person who “has been deported from, or has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or of 
former habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to undertake forced labour or who 
were deported for racial, religious or political reasons.” Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization, annex I, pt. I, § B, Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3, 13 [hereinafter IRO 
Constitution] (defining “displaced person”); see DPA § 2(b) (stating that in context of the DPA, the 
term “displaced person” is to be read consistent with its definition in the Constitution of the IRO). 
 43 DPA § 13 (listing categories of persons ineligible for a visa under the DPA). Congress limited 
the beneficiaries of the DPA to “any displaced person or refugee” as defined in the IRO Constitution. 
Id. § 2(b). Annex I of the IRO Constitution made ineligible for refugee or displaced person status any 
persons who had assisted in the persecution of members of the United Nations or who have voluntari-
ly assisted the enemy forces in their operations against the United Nations since the outbreak of World 
War II. IRO Constitution, annex I, pt. II, § 2 (listing “persons who will not be the concern of the 
[IRO]”). 
 44 See Refugee Act of 1980 § 201 (providing that refugee status may not be granted to “any per-
son who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”); 
McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 97 (finding that excluding those who participated in the persecution of 
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and resulting refugee crisis, the Refugee Act of 1980, which amended various 
parts of the INA, was implemented to comprehensively provide for any hu-
manitarian crisis.45 
Although application of the persecutor bar requires that the applicant par-
ticipated in the persecution of others on account of one of the five protected 
grounds, the INA does not define persecution either in substance or in scope.46 
In 2005, in Sahi v. Gonzales, Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit colorfully noted that although the BIA is charged with defining 
persecution in the INA, it has failed to do so despite numerous attempts.47 Due 
to the inability of the BIA to define persecution, the responsibility has fallen to 
the appellate courts to create a working definition.48 
The INA is equally silent on what amount of assistance or participation 
triggers the persecutor bar.49 Even in situations where the question of whether 
persecution occurred is uncontested, it may be difficult to determine whether a 
person was sufficiently involved to establish assistance or participation in the 
                                                                                                                           
others from the definition of refugee represents the view that such persons are “unworthy and not 
deserving of international protection”); Lori K. Walls, The Persecutor Bar in U.S. Immigration Law: 
Toward a More Nuanced Understanding of Modern “Persecution” in the Case of Forced Abortion 
and Female Genital Cutting, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 227, 231 (2007) (noting that by passing the 
Refugee Act of 1980 “Congress sought to provide a comprehensive, ideologically-neutral approach to 
defining ‘refugee’”). 
 45 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 519–20 (stating that because the DPA was enacted to address the 
postwar problems of World War II, it does not control the interpretation of the persecutor bar under 
the INA, which was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980 in order to provide for general treatment of 
refugees worldwide). Compare Refugee Act of 1980 (stating that the purpose of the Refugee Act of 
1980 was “to amend the [INA] . . . to establish a more uniform basis for the provision of assistance to 
refugees”), with DPA § 1 (stating that the purpose of the DPA was to enable admission to the United 
States of “certain European displaced persons”).  
 46 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (including “fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” in the definition of refugee yet not 
providing guidance on conduct that constitutes persecution); Bocova, 412 F.3d at 263 (stating that 
“the BIA has eschewed the articulation of rigid rules for determining when mistreatment sinks to the 
level of persecution, preferring instead to treat the issue on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis”). 
 47 See 416 F.3d 587, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the BIA has yet to define persecution 
and stating “we haven’t a clue as to what [the BIA] thinks religious persecution is”). 
 48 See Stanojkova, 645 F.3d at 949 (“Responsibility has by default devolved on the courts . . . to 
try to create some minimum coherence in the adjudication of claims of persecution . . . .”); Mansour v. 
Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 681 (9th Cir. 2004) (Pregerson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that “the definition of persecution that our court applies is a creature of purely our own case 
law”). But see Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that persecution has general-
ly been defined as “the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ . . . in a way regarded as 
offensive”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 49 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating that an alien is ineligible for asylum if he or she “as-
sisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of” others but failing to define what amounts to 
assistance or participation in persecution); see also Martine Forneret, Pulling the Trigger: An Analysis 
of Circuit Court Review of the “Persecutor Bar,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1007, 1017–18 (2013) (sum-
marizing four “triggering factors” concerning the applicant’s participation in the persecution that 
appellate courts use to determine whether an asylum applicant’s actions trigger the persecutor bar). 
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persecution.50 The origins of the courts’ jurisprudence regarding the level of 
activity required to constitute assistance in persecution can be traced back to a 
case decided soon after passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.51 
In 1981, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the 
case of a Ukrainian-born man granted asylum under the DPA and later natural-
ized as a U.S. citizen.52 Upon discovery that he served as a Nazi prison guard 
during World War II, the government sought to denaturalize and deport him, as 
he was ineligible for protection under the DPA and had thus gained his citizen-
ship illegally.53 Fedorenko admitted to his service as a Nazi prison guard, but 
claimed that he was forced to do so as a captured Soviet soldier.54 Despite his 
claim that he was forced to work as a guard against his will, the Court held that 
his denaturalization was justified regardless of whether he performed his duties 
under duress.55 The Court concluded that it could not interpret the DPA to in-
clude an exception for involuntary actions and that the controlling question 
was an objective one: whether the particular conduct can be considered, at the 
very least, assistance in the persecution of others.56 
The debate over the relevancy of duress in the application of the persecu-
tor bar resurfaced in 2009 when the Court decided Negusie v. Holder.57 Rely-
                                                                                                                           
 50 Compare Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143–44 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the appli-
cant played a minor role in China’s coercive population control program by transporting women to 
hospitals where they would receive forced abortions), with Yan Yan Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75, 81–
82 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the applicant’s conduct “as a whole” demonstrates that she did not 
play a role in China’s coercive population control program) (internal quotations omitted). 
 51 See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 & n.34 (addressing the question of when conduct is considered 
assisting in the persecution of others); see also Castaneda-Castillo v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 112, 133 (1st 
Cir. 2006) (stating that in cases where whether the applicant assisted in persecution is unclear, the 
courts look to footnote 34 in Fedorenko for direction); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 140 (referring to 
Fedorenko when determining what constitutes assistance in persecution). 
 52 449 U.S. at 496–97 (describing the falsified story told by a former Nazi prison guard to immi-
gration officials of being displaced from Poland). 
 53 See id. at 493 (stating that the government sought to denaturalize the defendant on account of 
his failure to disclose the fact that he served as an armed guard at a Nazi concentration camp during 
World War II, which would have “rendered his citizenship revocable as ‘illegally procured’ or pro-
cured by willful misrepresentation of a material fact”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (requiring revoca-
tion of U.S. citizenship “illegally procured or . . . procured by concealment of a material fact or by 
willful misrepresentation”). 
 54 See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 500 (recounting the respondent’s testimony that while he was 
forced to serve as a Nazi guard after being imprisoned with fellow Russian soldiers, he did not have 
“personal involvement in the atrocities committed at the camp”). 
 55 See id. at 512 (“The plain language of the [DPA] mandates precisely the literal interpretation 
. . . [that] an individual’s service as a concentration camp armed guard—whether voluntary or invol-
untary—made him ineligible for a visa.”). 
 56 See id. (stating that “Congress was perfectly capable of adopting a ‘voluntariness’ limitation” 
on the persecutor bar, and that by omitting the word “voluntary” from the DPA, Congress must have 
intended “all those who assisted in persecution of civilians [to be] ineligible for visas”). 
 57 See 555 U.S. at 517–18 (confirming that the INA’s persecutor bar statute is ambiguous regard-
ing the relevancy of coercion or duress). 
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ing on Fedorenko, the BIA and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
both upheld the immigration judge’s decision to deny Negusie’s asylum appli-
cation due to his role in the persecution of others.58 The Supreme Court reject-
ed the lower courts’ reasoning, finding that they relied on the wrong statute; 
unlike in Fedorenko, the persecutor bar in question in Negusie was that of the 
INA, not the DPA.59 Though the Court refused to determine the availability of 
duress as a defense to the persecutor bar, the majority opinion reasoned that 
both the statutory language and principles of the now-defunct DPA are distinct 
from the INA, and therefore, it is not clear whether Congress intended to disal-
low a duress defense to the INA’s persecutor bar.60 
In 2018, on remand in Matter of Negusie I, the BIA concluded that duress 
is relevant to the application of the INA’s persecutor bar.61 In doing so, the 
BIA acknowledged that the subjective intent of the asylum applicant must be 
considered when assessing his persecutory conduct.62 The duress defense pro-
posed by the BIA, however, was narrowly cabined and requires various condi-
tions, the first of which is that the applicant acted under an imminent threat of 
death or serious bodily injury to himself or others.63 Finding that the threats 
made to Negusie when he refused to comply with the Eritrean Army did not 
satisfy this standard, the BIA affirmed the application of the persecutor bar.64 
                                                                                                                           
 58 See id. at 514 (noting that the lower court affirmed the immigration judge’s decision because 
“the persecutor bar applies even if the alien’s assistance in persecution was coerced or otherwise the 
product of duress”); Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512–13 (holding that an applicant is ineligible for asylum 
regardless of whether his persecutory acts were involuntary). 
 59 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 518–20 (noting that “Fedorenko . . . addressed a different statute en-
acted for a different purpose” and thus “[did] not control the BIA’s interpretation of this persecutor 
bar”). 
 60 See id. at 524 (remanding the case to the BIA with specific instructions to consider the differ-
ence in statutory scheme between the DPA and INA in considering whether coercion and duress are 
relevant in application of the persecutor bar). 
 61 See 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363 (holding that the “duress standard is intended to apply only in rare 
and extraordinary circumstances”). The BIA required an asylum applicant to prove “by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he (1) acted under an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to 
himself or others; (2) reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out unless he 
acted or refrained from acting; (3) had no reasonable opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the 
threat; (4) did not place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should have known that 
he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; and (5) knew or reasonably should have known 
that the harm he inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.” Id. 
 62 See id. (holding that an applicant is not necessarily made ineligible for asylum by the persecu-
tor bar if he or she acted under duress). But see Matter of Negusie II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 481 (staying 
the BIA’s decision and inviting amicus briefs on the question of “[w]hether coercion and duress are 
relevant to the application of the Immigration and Nationality Act’s persecutor bar”). 
 63 Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363 (proposing five requirements that the applicant 
must prove in order to meet the standard for a duress defense to the persecutor bar). 
 64 Id. at 368 (holding that the verbal death threats “did not constitute the imminent threat of death 
or serious bodily injury”). The BIA also concluded that the applicant “had a reasonable opportunity to 
escape or otherwise avoid guarding the prisoners” and therefore did not meet the criteria for a duress 
defense. Id. (explaining that because the applicant had previously escaped from the military base and 
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Although the decisions from Fedorenko and Matter of Negusie I clarify 
that directly committing persecutory acts triggers the persecutor bar, subject to 
a narrow duress defense, they do not clarify how to assess conduct that is indi-
rectly related to and relatively far removed from persecution.65 Instead, as Sec-
tions C and D of this Part will demonstrate, the circuit courts have created sim-
ilar tests that apply the persecutor bar to applicants as long as they knowingly 
contributed to and objectively furthered the persecution of others.66 
C. Circuit Courts’ Interpretation of “Assistance in Persecution” 
Despite the Court’s clarification in Negusie that its holding in Fedorenko 
may not be used to determine whether there is a duress defense to the INA’s 
persecutor bar, courts still consider Fedorenko when analyzing whether con-
duct amounts to assistance in persecution.67 Rather than setting out a clear def-
inition of what constitutes assistance in persecution, however, the Court in Fe-
dorenko offered guidance, imbedded within a footnote, in the form of a hypo-
thetical test case.68 
In its footnote, the Court compared the actions of a prison barber who 
merely cut inmates hair before they were executed with those of a prison guard 
who was armed, paid for his duties, and willing to shoot at escaping inmates 
upon command from his superior officer.69 Standing on different ends of the 
spectrum, the Court clarified that the barber would not be found to have assist-
                                                                                                                           
walked to his friend’s home through the jungle, he had a reasonable opportunity to escape or avoid 
guarding the prisoners). 
 65 See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512–14 (holding that the applicant’s direct persecutory conduct as 
a Nazi prison guard made him ineligible for asylum); Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363 
(holding that there is a limited duress defense to the persecutor bar); Forneret, supra note 49, at 1026 
(stating that there is “inconsistency both between circuits and internally within circuits” in determin-
ing whether tangential participation by the asylum applicant in the persecutory act implicates the per-
secutor bar). 
 66 See infra notes 67–114 and accompanying text. 
 67 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522–23 (finding that the BIA was wrong to rely on Fedorenko in 
determining whether the persecutor bar applies to both voluntary and involuntary persecutory acts); 
Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that where voluntariness in committing 
persecutory acts is not in question, Fedorenko is proper precedent for “defining what constitutes ‘as-
sisting in persecution’”). 
 68 See 449 U.S. at 512 & n.34 (providing examples of individuals who did and did not assist in 
persecution); see also Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating 
that the Court’s “somewhat cryptic footnote” in Fedorenko “has since become the principal guide to 
interpreting persecutor exceptions”). 
 69 Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 512 & n.34 (stating that “an individual who did no more than cut the 
hair of female inmates before they were executed cannot be found to have assisted in the persecution 
of civilians” while “there can be no question that a guard who was issued a uniform and armed with a 
rifle and a pistol, who was paid a stipend and was regularly allowed to leave the concentration camp 
to visit a nearby village, and who admitted to shooting at escaping inmates on orders from the com-
mandant of the camp, fits within the statutory language about persons who assisted in the persecution 
of civilians”). 
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ed in persecution while the guard unquestionably would have been found to 
assist in persecution.70 While noting that the comparison of the barber to the 
guard offered a clear distinction, the Court did not venture to make a more nu-
anced definition of what constitutes assistance in persecution, ultimately find-
ing it unnecessary in the case at hand.71 Since 1981, circuit courts have used 
the footnote in Fedorenko comparing the prison barber with the prison guard 
as a starting point in identifying assistance in persecution.72 
In 2006, in Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit found that an asylum applicant, Miranda, assisted in persecu-
tion when he provided translation services to the Peruvian police force during 
interrogations of members of an opposing radical political group.73 Though 
Miranda knew the opposition members would be tortured after their inter-
views, he did not participate in the torture itself.74 Furthermore, he attempted 
to resign from the police force in disapproval of the police’s abusive tactics 
and received multiple death threats from the opposition group targeting both 
him and his family.75 In deciding whether to apply the persecutor bar, the 
Ninth Circuit found both the threats against his family and his attempt to resign 
irrelevant.76 Instead, once determining that he was not coerced into acting as a 
translator, the court’s decision turned on whether Miranda’s actions were inte-
gral to the persecution that occurred.77 Despite finding the case to be at “the 
margin of the culpability required under the statute,” the Ninth Circuit applied 
the persecutor bar because Miranda knew that his translation services were 
necessary within the chain of events that ultimately led to the persecution of 
others.78 
                                                                                                                           
 70 See id. (clarifying that the persecutor bar would be applied to a Nazi prison guard but not to a 
barber who merely cut the hair of Nazi prisoners). 
 71 See id. (“Other cases may present more difficult line-drawing problems but we need decide 
only this case.”). 
 72 See Parlak, 578 F.3d at 468 (noting that “courts have since looked to Fedorenko for guidance 
in determining what constitutes ‘assisting in persecution’”). 
 73 See Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 919, 929–30 (finding that the applicant “materially assisted 
the persecution” of members of an opposing political group without legal justification, and therefore 
was ineligible for asylum). 
 74 Id. at 918–19 (describing the applicant’s admission to witnessing the torture of opposing politi-
cal members but denial of playing a direct role in it). 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. at 929 (failing to consider threats against the applicant’s family when determining 
whether there were extenuating circumstances that would lift the persecutor bar). 
 77 See id. at 929–30 (finding that because the applicant failed to prove that he acted in self-
defense, the persecutor bar would apply as long as the applicant’s conduct materially assisted and 
furthered the persecution). 
 78 See id. (applying the persecutor bar despite acknowledging that the applicant was not in a posi-
tion of authority, did not directly torture the victims, and did not use force in any way to detain the 
victims). 
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In 2010, in Ntamack v. Holder, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit employed a similar objective test when it upheld the persecutor bar 
against a member of the Cameroonian civic guard.79 During the fourteen years 
of Ntamack’s service, there were reports of repeated human rights abuses by 
the civic guard against Cameroonian civilians.80 Ntamack, however, opposed 
such abuses and was imprisoned three times throughout his tenure by his supe-
riors for refusing to engage in such violence.81 On the second occasion, he was 
standing with his unit to suppress a student protest demanding political free-
dom.82 When Ntamack refused to join the other members of his unit in beating 
and arresting the students, he was imprisoned and beaten.83 Later, during his 
third imprisonment, he was beaten unconscious before escaping from prison 
and fleeing for the United States.84 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower 
courts’ application of the persecutor bar, finding that by merely standing with 
the civic guard while they violently suppressed the protesting students, 
Ntamack objectively furthered persecution.85 The court did not find his legiti-
mate fear of torture upon return to Cameroon to be relevant to the determina-
tion.86 
Other circuit courts employ tests similar to those of the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits, examining the totality of the applicant’s conduct to determine wheth-
er they knowingly contributed to and had an objective effect on the persecution 
of others.87 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See 372 F. App’x 407, 411 (4th Cir. 2010) (affirming the BIA’s application of the persecutor 
bar because the applicant’s conduct “objectively furthered persecution”). 
 80 See id. at 408 (noting the frequent human rights abuses by the Cameroonian government re-
ported by the U.S. Department of State, “including unlawful killings, the use of harsh interrogation 
techniques, and torture”). 
 81 See id. at 409 (discussing three separate incidents in which the applicant was imprisoned by the 
civic guard for refusing to “employ violent tactics” and suspicion of his political beliefs). 
 82 Id. (describing the applicant’s refusal to engage in violence against a student demonstration at 
the University of Yaounde “during which the students were demanding democratic reforms and free-
dom”). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 411. 
 86 See id. at 411–12 (discussing the application of the persecutor bar without considering the 
applicant’s fear of bodily injury if returned to Cameroon). The court also did not find the applicant’s 
“redemptive acts,” which included warning students about upcoming raids, to be relevant. See id. at 
412 (stating that redemptive acts do not eliminate evidence of assistance in persecution, and therefore 
do not factor into the application of the persecutor bar). 
 87 See Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558 F.3d 450, 458 (6th Cir. 2009) (evaluating applicant’s claim 
that she did not know that her conduct would lead to persecutory acts by analyzing whether there was 
a nexus between the applicant’s conduct and the persecution of others and whether the applicant had 
knowledge of the ongoing persecution); Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739–41 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that the taking of individuals into custody to face police abuse triggered the persecutor bar 
because it constituted a link in the chain of persecutory acts rather than an “inconsequential associa-
tion with persecutors”). There is, however, disagreement among the circuit courts regarding the extent 
to which an applicant’s personal motivation should be considered. See Brigette L. Frantz, Assistance 
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D. A Case Study: The Second Circuit’s Application of the  
Persecutor Bar to China’s One-Child Policy 
1. Specific Recognition of Persons Fleeing China’s One-Child Policy 
In an effort to halt the rapid growth rate of the country with the world’s 
largest population, in 1979 China enacted its “one-child policy.”88 Although 
condemned publicly by authorities, government actors routinely performed 
forced abortions and sterilizations on women who were pregnant with their 
second child.89 If women were in hiding, government officials subjected their 
families, friends, and neighbors to fines, beatings, and imprisonment for stay-
ing quiet.90 
In 1996, as part of The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (IIRIRA), the United States further amended its definition of 
refugee by including coercive population control as a form of persecution 
based on political opinion.91 To prove victimization of coercive population 
                                                                                                                           
in Persecution Under Duress: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Negusie v. Holder and the Misplaced 
Reliance on Fedorenko v. United States, 3 U.S. DEP’T JUST., IMMIGR. L. ADVISOR, no. 5, May 2009, 
at 1, 4 (explaining that the circuit courts differ regarding the extent to which they consider the appli-
cant’s motivation or voluntariness when applying the persecutor bar).  
 88 See Tessa Bernson, Here’s How China’s One-Child Policy Started in the First Place, TIME 
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://time.com/4092689/china-one-child-policy-history/ [https://perma.cc/DE7V-
KBBH] (stating that in the 1970s, when many countries were worried about overpopulation, China 
“took an extreme approach to the problem” by introducing a national policy limiting couples of Han 
ethnicity to one child); see also Wendy Connett, Understanding China’s Former One Child Policy, 
INVESTOPEDIA (July 7, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/120114/understanding-
chinas-one-child-policy.asp [https://perma.cc/R9E4-R8YR] (explaining that China’s population, 
which reached 970 million in 1979, was outpacing the country’s food supply). 
 89 See Nathan Vanderklippe, The Ghost Children: In the Wake of China’s One-Child Policy, a 
Generation Is Lost, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/
the-ghost-children-in-the-wake-of-chinas-one-child-policy-a-generation-is-lost/article23454402/ [https://
perma.cc/9EEE-NXNF] (reporting that as part of China’s one-child policy, there have been an esti-
mated 336 million abortions, 196 million sterilizations, and 403 million intrauterine device inser-
tions); Michael Weisskopf & Wash. Post Foreign Serv., One Couple, One Child: Abortion Policy 
Tears at China’s Society, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 1985), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/
politics/1985/01/07/one-couple-one-child-second-of-three-articles-abortion-policy-tears-at-chinas-
society/5abf0d83-b01f-46c5-80be-a6ca2dc20958/ [https://perma.cc/A2P3-YAWF] (stating that gov-
ernment officials publicly claim to “rely on the powers of persuasion and education” in accomplishing 
its one-child policy). 
 90 See Chen Guangcheng, Opinion, China Is Finally Ending the One-Child Policy. It Can’t Hap-
pen Soon Enough, WASH. POST (June 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/china-is-
finally-ending-the-one-child-policy-it-cant-happen-soon-enough/2018/06/11/5dde684c-6b4b-11e8-
9e38-24e693b38637_story.html [https://perma.cc/SE8V-2JLY] (reporting that in enforcing the coun-
try’s one-child policy, Chinese authorities forced women out of hiding by kidnapping their family 
members, friends and neighbors, holding them in “prison-like conditions for days or weeks, extorting 
them for cash or beating them until the [women] revealed themselves”). 
 91 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 § 601(a), Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA] (amending the definition of refugee in the 
INA by adding that “a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary 
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control, an applicant must show that he or she was forced or fears being forced 
to undergo an abortion or sterilization or fears being persecuted for resisting 
such a procedure.92 As a collateral effect, the provision made anyone who or-
dered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the policy ineligible for 
asylum due to the persecutor bar.93 
2. Application of the Persecutor Bar to China’s One-Child Policy 
By recognizing China’s coercive population control as per se persecution, 
anyone who is found to have assisted or otherwise participated in enforcing the 
policy may be deemed ineligible for asylum, including victims of the policy.94 
In applying the persecutor bar to the one-child policy, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit casts a wide net that reaches not only the govern-
ment officials who set the policy and the doctors who perform forced abor-
                                                                                                                           
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other 
resistance to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on ac-
count of political opinion, and a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to 
undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be 
deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of political opinion”). In identifying 
coercive population control as a recognized form of persecution, the IIRIRA provision overruled the 
BIA’s decision in Matter of Chang, which held that persecution inflicted by the Chinese government 
on account of opposition to its one-child policy did not qualify an applicant for asylum under one of 
the five protected grounds listed in the definition of refugee in the INA. See 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 44 
(B.I.A. 1989) (finding that the implementation of China’s one-child policy, if “solely tied to control-
ling population, rather than as a guise for acting against people” who would be protected as a refugee 
under the INA, does not render those subject to the policy as “victims of persecution or hav[ing] a 
well-founded fear of persecution”). 
 92 See Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 425 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that in passing the IIRIRA, 
Congress’s unambiguous intent was to protect those who had undergone forced abortions or steriliza-
tions, been persecuted for resisting, or who had a well-founded fear of such persecution). More spar-
ingly, men too have been granted asylum by demonstrating that their wives were subjected to coercive 
population control methods. See Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915, 917–19 (B.I.A. 1997) (con-
firming that forced abortion or sterilization is an infringement on a married couple’s shared reproduc-
tive rights, and therefore may qualify a woman for refugee status as well as her husband). 
 93 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (stating that an alien is ineligible for asylum if he or she “ordered, 
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion”); id. § 1101(a)(42) 
(recognizing that victims of coercive population control are considered to have been persecuted on 
account of political opinion). 
 94 See Yaqin Chen v. Att’y Gen., 622 F. App’x 155, 157, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding a mid-
wife who assisted doctors in five to six forced abortions to be ineligible for asylum due to the persecu-
tor bar); Su Qing Chen v. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding a Chinese 
government worker who guarded women detained for violating family planning policies to be ineligi-
ble for asylum due to the persecutor bar); Xing Jie Guan v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration 
Servs., 183 F. App’x 76, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding a hospital worker who prepared for forced 
abortions, as well as aided women after forced abortions, to be ineligible for asylum due to the perse-
cutor bar despite later undergoing a forced abortion herself). 
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tions, but also any person who at some point knowingly furthered the execu-
tion of the policy.95 
In 2006, in Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, the Second Circuit considered the ex-
tent to which one must be involved in implementing China’s one-child policy 
to be subject to the persecutor bar.96 The Second Circuit held that a driver who 
transported women to hospitals where they would be subjected to forced abor-
tions sufficiently assisted in persecution to trigger the persecutor bar.97 Xie 
transported three to five women total and on his final trip he helped a woman 
escape as soon as there was no other guard present.98 In its analysis, the Sec-
ond Circuit looked at the totality of Xie’s conduct to determine whether it fur-
thered the persecution or was merely tangential.99 Because the driver’s actions 
were “but-for” causes of the women’s forced abortions, the Second Circuit 
found that the driver’s conduct triggered the persecutor bar.100 
In 2009, in Yanqin Weng v. Holder, the Second Circuit found that alt-
hough a nurse’s assistant worked in a Chinese public hospital that performed 
forced abortions, her actions did not violate the persecutor bar.101 In departure 
from Weng’s typical duties, one day she was required to watch over patients 
awaiting forced abortion procedures to ensure they did not escape.102 After 
standing guard for just ten minutes, she helped a patient escape.103 Weng was 
physically abused, fired, and repeatedly interrogated about the missing patient, 
causing her to flee to the United States and apply for asylum.104 Relying on its 
ruling in Xie as precedent, the Second Circuit found that the entirety of Weng’s 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Forneret, supra note 49, at 1027–30 (noting that the Second Circuit applies the persecutor 
bar on both direct and indirect participants in China’s one-child policy). 
 96 See 434 F.3d at 140–43 (relying on precedent dealing with forms of persecution other than 
coercive population control programs to determine what constitutes assistance in persecution). 
 97 See id. at 143–44 (finding that Xie “played an active and direct” role in forced abortions, and 
therefore is ineligible for asylum due to the persecutor bar). 
 98 Id. at 138. 
 99 See id. at 142–43 (distinguishing between conduct that had direct persecutory consequences for 
victims and “conduct [that] was tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature”). 
 100 See id. at 143–44 (finding that because the applicant’s role in transporting women to hospitals 
where they would undergo forced abortions was a necessary step to the performance of forced abor-
tions, it was “active and had direct consequences for the victims”). In response to Xie’s argument that 
the bar should be lifted due to his role in helping the final woman escape, the court indicated that 
redemptive acts may be relevant to the analysis but did not find it instructive in this case. See id. at 
144. 
 101 See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 512–13, 515–16 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that ap-
plicant’s conduct as a nurse’s assistant, in its entirety, did not amount to assistance in persecution 
sufficient to implicate the persecutor bar). 
 102 Id. at 512 (describing applicant’s typical job duties as “registering patients, assisting nurses in 
caring for patients, recording vital signs, and maintaining patients’ files”). One night, due to a traffic 
accident that caused the hospital to be abnormally busy, Weng was assigned to guard five pregnant 
women who were detained to undergo forced abortions. Id. 
 103 Id. at 512–13, 515. 
 104 Id. 
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conduct was tangential and not sufficiently direct, active, or integral to carry-
ing out the forced abortions.105 The court distinguished Weng’s conduct from 
that of Xie, finding her actions to be too attenuated from the forced abortions 
to constitute assistance in the persecution.106 
During the same session, in Yan Yan Lin v. Holder, the Second Circuit 
found that the applicant’s actions did not trigger the bar.107 Lin was a maternity 
nurse at a state-run hospital that performed forced abortions.108 She performed 
various tasks at all pregnancy stages, some of which were for women who 
would later be forced to undergo abortions.109 After helping one woman escape 
from the hospital, Lin was interrogated by the police, driving her to seek asy-
lum in the United States.110 Placing Lin’s role in the persecution of others 
somewhere in between that of Xie and Weng, the Second Circuit ultimately 
found that because her actions did not make the forced abortions more likely to 
occur, her actions were closer to Weng’s and therefore did not amount to assis-
tance in persecution.111 
By looking at the objective effect of the applicant’s conduct in applying 
the persecutor bar to persons involved in China’s one-child policy, the Second 
Circuit’s analysis is consistent with other circuit courts.112 In cases of forced 
abortions, if the actions contributed directly to or were in furtherance of the 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See id. at 515–16 (holding that the applicant’s behavior did not cross the line from passive 
conduct to conduct that assists in persecution); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 142–43 (distinguishing 
between conduct that is active and has direct consequences for victims and conduct that is tangential 
and passive in nature). 
 106 See Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 516 (distinguishing the applicant’s conduct from the driver in 
Zhang Jian Xie because her role in the forced abortions was less substantial and not a necessary step 
in the ultimate persecutory acts). 
 107 See 584 F.3d at 81–82 (holding that Lin’s conduct as a whole did not amount to assistance in 
persecution). 
 108 Id. at 77. 
 109 Id. at 77–78 (identifying the applicant’s job duties as a nurse in a state-run hospital, including, 
“tending to pregnant women, assisting in the performance of ultrasound and other prenatal examina-
tions, participating in live-birth deliveries, caring for newborns, and providing recovery care to wom-
en who had undergone forced abortions”). 
 110 Id. at 78 (explaining why applicant fled her native China to apply for asylum in the United 
States). While working at the hospital, Lin realized that she knew one of the patients scheduled to 
undergo a forced abortion and later helped her escape from the hospital. Id. Lin was questioned im-
mediately as well as months later by a doctor and government officials. Id. 
 111 See id. at 80–82 (comparing Lin’s conduct with the applicants’ conduct in Zhang Jian Xie and 
Yanqin Weng). 
 112 See Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 516 (holding that, because Weng did not “engage in conduct 
necessary to [the] commission of forced abortions,” her conduct did not trigger the persecutor bar); 
Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 142–43 (holding that in assessing the applicant’s actions as a whole, the 
court must decipher between conduct that was “active and had direct consequences for the victims” 
and conduct that was “tangential to the acts of oppression and passive in nature”); see also Miranda 
Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 929–30 (basing application of persecutor bar on whether the applicant’s con-
duct “materially assisted the persecution” so as to further the persecution). 
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procedure, the court has applied the persecutor bar.113 On the other hand, if the 
actions had no causal connection to the ultimate abortion and did not make it 
more likely to occur, the court is unwilling to apply the bar.114 
II. A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE PERSECUTOR BAR 
In interpreting the INA’s persecutor bar, circuit courts have developed 
straightforward and consistent tests that focus solely on whether the applicant 
knowingly furthered the persecution of others.115 The rigidity of such tests are 
emblematic of the inflexible and binary nature of U.S. immigration law.116 Var-
ious critiques have been voiced both within the United States and internation-
ally that call for a more nuanced approach not only to the exclusion clauses to 
asylum, but immigration law more generally.117 Section A of this Part exposes 
the inflexibility of the persecutor bar and explores the calls for injecting more 
creativity in its application.118 Section B discusses a proposed balancing test 
when applying the exclusion clause to applicants for prior non-political 
crimes.119 Section C returns to the analysis of China’s one-child policy to ex-
amine whether barring those indirectly involved with carrying out the policy is 
consistent with the basic rationale for exclusion clauses.120 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See Xing Jie Guan, 183 F. App’x at 78 (holding that because the applicant’s role in preparing 
women for forced abortions, “even if relatively minor,” furthered the implementation of China’s one-
child policy, her conduct was in violation of the persecutor bar and therefore she was ineligible for 
asylum); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 143 (finding that because the applicant played “an active and 
direct, if arguably minor, role” in persecution by driving the women to the hospital where they would 
undergo forced abortions, his conduct triggered the persecutor bar). 
 114 See Yan Yan Lin, 584 F.3d at 81–82 (finding that Lin’s performance of routine prenatal exams 
did not cause the abortions nor make them more likely to occur, and therefore, her conduct did not 
trigger the persecutor bar); Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 515 (finding that by standing guard for just ten 
minutes before helping a victim escape, the applicant’s “conduct neither caused the abortions, nor 
made it easier or more likely that they would occur” and therefore her actions were, “at most, ‘tangen-
tial,’ ‘passive accommodation’ of the conduct of others, and thus they do not trigger the persecutor 
bar”). 
 115 See supra Part I. 
 116 See generally Forneret, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 117 See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1741 (2009) 
(arguing for the implementation of a system of “proportionate sanctions” that considers the nature of 
the immigration violation). 
 118 See infra notes 121–147 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra notes 148–171 and accompanying text. 
 120 See infra notes 172–186 and accompanying text. 
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A. Calls for Creativity 
1. The Rigid Box of the Persecutor Bar 
What constitutes “persecution,” as used in the INA, is ambiguous.121 
What amounts to assistance or participation in persecution is likewise ambigu-
ous.122 Once it has been established that an applicant did assist in persecution, 
however, the result in U.S. immigration law becomes clear—a statutory bar on 
asylum.123 By deeming applicants who “incited, ordered, assisted, or otherwise 
participated in” the persecution of others to be ineligible for asylum, the INA’s 
persecutor bar lumps all violators together as an undesirable class of people.124 
Irrespective of whether the applicant played a significant or minor role in the 
eventual persecution, the statute unequivocally denies asylum.125 
Though the exact language the courts use in their analyses differs slightly, 
the focus remains on the objective effect of the applicant’s conduct.126 In other 
words, as long as the court finds that the applicant’s conduct in any way fur-
thered the persecution and the applicant had knowledge that his or her actions 
would further the persecution, the courts invariably apply the persecutor bar.127 
                                                                                                                           
 121 See Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the INA does not 
define the term “persecution”); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:2 
(Aug. 2019 ed.) (stating that the drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention intentionally left “persecu-
tion” undefined so that it could be interpreted in a flexible manner). 
 122 See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the 
Court’s attempt at defining assistance in persecution in Fedorenko was “somewhat cryptic”). 
 123 See, e.g., Singh v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 736, 739–41 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming application of 
persecutor bar where the applicant, as a police officer, took members of a minority religious group 
into custody where he knew they would be physically abused); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) 
(2018) (making persons who engaged in the persecution of others ineligible for asylum). 
 124 See Singh, 417 F.3d at 739–41 (contrasting persecutory acts of Nazi guards, “whose complete 
existence was premised upon the persecution of innocent civilians,” with local police officers who 
could be furthering “legitimate law enforcement purposes” in addition to engaging the persecution of 
religious minorities); Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97 (B.I.A. 1984) (stating that the 
INA’s persecutor bar “represents the view that those who have participated in the persecution of oth-
ers are unworthy and not deserving of international protection”). 
 125 See Xing Jie Guan v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 183 F. App’x 76, 77–78 
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the applicant’s conduct, “even if relatively minor,” amounted to assistance 
in persecution and thus triggered the persecutor bar); Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (finding that even though the applicant played an “arguably minor” role in persecution, his 
conduct triggered the persecutor bar). 
 126 Compare Suzhen Meng v. Holder, 770 F.3d 1071, 1074 (2d Cir. 2014) (identifying the four-
part test employed by the Second Circuit in determining whether the applicant’s conduct constitutes 
assistance in persecution), with Quitanilla v. Holder, 758 F.3d 570, 577 (4th Cir. 2014) (identifying 
the two-part test employed by the Fourth Circuit in determining whether the applicant’s conduct con-
stitutes assistance in persecution), and Kumar v. Holder, 728 F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2013) (identi-
fying the two-part test employed by the Ninth Circuit in determining whether the applicant’s conduct 
constitutes assistance in persecution). 
 127 See Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 515–16 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the applicant’s 
“conduct neither caused the abortions, nor made it easier or more likely that they would occur” and 
therefore does not trigger the persecutor bar); Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558 F.3d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 
2020] Balancing the Persecutor Bar in U.S. Asylum Law 405 
Furthermore, despite the BIA’s recent recognition that the persecutor bar is not 
necessarily triggered if one assisted in persecution under duress, former Attorney 
General Sessions issued an automatic stay of the decision.128 Though the deci-
sion remains stayed at the time of this Note, it may ultimately be overruled.129 
2. Thinking Outside the Rigid Box 
In straying somewhat from the pack, some courts have suggested that an 
applicant’s redemptive acts ought to be considered when assessing whether to 
apply the persecutor bar.130 For example, both the Second and Seventh Circuits 
have remanded cases to the BIA with instructions to determine whether the 
applicant’s redemptive acts could weigh in favor of granting asylum, especial-
ly if the applicant took risks in order to protect those who were being persecut-
ed.131 In subsequent cases, however, the Second Circuit has seemingly walked 
back this position, suggesting that redemptive acts are not a significant part of 
the determination whether a person assisted or participated in persecution.132 
                                                                                                                           
2009) (analyzing whether there was a “nexus between the [applicant’s] actions and the persecution of 
others” and whether the applicant had knowledge of the ongoing persecution); Singh, 417 F.3d at 
739–40 (holding that the taking of individuals into custody to face police abuse triggered the persecu-
tor bar because it constituted a link in the chain of persecutory acts rather than an “inconsequential 
association with persecutors”). 
 128 See Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363 (holding that the availability of a duress de-
fense to the persecutor bar is “narrow” and “is intended to apply only in rare and extraordinary cir-
cumstances”); Matter of Negusie II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 481 (issuing an automatic stay on the BIA’s 
holding in Matter of Negusie I). 
 129 See Fatma E. Marouf, Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases, 66 
UCLA L. REV. 142, 195 (2019) (arguing that former-Attorney General Sessions’ “decision to recon-
sider the relevance of a duress defense suggests that he may well overrule the BIA’s decision” in Mat-
ter of Negusie I). 
 130 See James Lockhart, Annotation, Construction and Application of 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a)(42), 
1158(b)(2)(A)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(i), Predecessor Statutes, and Applicable Regulations, 29 A.L.R. Fed. 
2d 267, § 29 (2008) (discussing cases in which the court noted that a noncitizen who “sought to pre-
vent similar persecutory acts from occurring” may be able to overcome application of the persecutor 
bar). 
 131 See Doe v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2007) (instructing the BIA to consider 
whether the applicant may be granted asylum if his “attenuated participation in the persecution” was 
offset by his redemptive acts, which put himself at risk); Ofosu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694, 701 (2d Cir. 
1996) (noting that the court had not yet had the opportunity to consider whether the persecutor bar 
should be applied to someone who had rejected the persecution or “put himself at risk in order to 
protect those who were persecuted”). But see Ntamack v. Holder, 372 F. App’x 407, 412 (4th Cir. 
2010) (clarifying that though the applicant’s redemptive acts demonstrate that he disagreed with the 
persecutory acts committed by the civic guard, they do not compel the court to lift the persecutor bar). 
 132 See, e.g., Yan Yan Lin v. Holder, 584 F.3d 75, 78, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that in view-
ing the applicant’s conduct, her redemptive act of helping a woman escape before undergoing a forced 
abortion merely “bolstered” the decision not to apply the persecutor bar); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 
144 (clarifying that redemptive behavior is not “necessarily irrelevant to the inquiry as to whether an 
applicant has assisted in persecution”). 
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One consideration present in other areas of immigration law yet absent in 
the application of the persecutor bar is the time elapsed since the alleged per-
secutory conduct.133 When determining eligibility for certain immigration ben-
efits outside of the asylum context, conduct that would otherwise constitute a 
violation is ignored if not sufficiently recent.134 One justification for including 
temporal limitations is to acknowledge that individuals may rehabilitate over 
time, and are thus no longer deserving of sanctions.135 In applying the persecu-
tor bar, however, courts consider the time elapsed since the persecutory acts to 
be irrelevant.136 
Finally, the severity of the applicant’s conduct offers another factor that 
courts downplay when applying the persecutor bar and when evaluating immi-
gration violations more generally.137 Unlike in other areas of the legal system, 
such as criminal, contract, and tort law, the consequences of violating immigra-
tion laws are often inflicted without proportionality.138 For example, in crimi-
nal law, holding all things equal, the theory of retributive justice suggests that 
one can expect to receive punishment that fits the crime.139 In terms of immi-
                                                                                                                           
 133 See, e.g., Pastora v. Holder, 737 F.3d 902, 906 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying the persecutor bar 
despite the fact that the applicant had not participated in persecutory conduct in twenty-seven years). 
See generally Juliet Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1705, 1713–16 (2009) (discussing how the naturalization process accounts for the elapsed time 
between application and the problematic conduct). 
 134 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (requiring that an applicant demonstrate that he or she “has been 
and still is a person of good moral character” for only “five years immediately preceding the filing of 
his [or her] application” for naturalization). 
 135 See Stumpf, supra note 133, at 1713–16 (describing the various roles that time plays in the 
naturalization process and providing rationalizations for its inclusion in immigration statutes). 
 136 See, e.g., Pastora, 737 F.3d at 906 (finding that a twenty-seven-year gap did not negate the 
persecutor bar). 
 137 See supra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (explaining that in applying the persecutor bar, 
the tests employed by the circuit courts merely require that the applicant’s conduct furthered the per-
secution of others, regardless of its severity). 
 138 See Stumpf, supra note 117, at 1688–91 (comparing the various methods of inserting propor-
tionality into punishment or damage awards stemming from violations of other branches of law with 
the “on-off switch” of deportation as the sole sanction in immigration law). While noncitizens, deport-
able by statute, may remain in the country via statutory relief and officer discretion, the immigration 
system ultimately either exempts deportation or merely postpones it. See id. at 1694–98 (describing 
relief from deportation and officer discretion as “unique characteristics . . . [that] create an appearance 
of proportionality”). Tasked with managing immigration law and its violators to the best of their abili-
ties, immigration officials have prosecutorial discretion in initiating deportation proceedings and so 
will not prosecute all immigration violators. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 621 (2006) (stating that immigration officers’ discretion allows them to decide 
to charge an immigration violator by “considering the full complexity of an applicant’s situation rather 
than reducing it to a checklist of standard factors”). 
 139 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments); 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72–73 (2003) (finding that grossly disproportionate criminal sen-
tences may violate the Eighth Amendment). 
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gration consequences, however, two strikingly different crimes produce the 
same result: removal from the United States.140 
The push for injecting proportionality into the U.S. immigration system 
has been voiced by legal scholars in their call for overhauling the way immi-
gration violations are treated.141 Some scholars argue that rather than the cur-
rent binary system that prescribes deportation as the only sanction, a system of 
graduating sanctions should be established that takes into consideration various 
circumstances surrounding the violation.142 Under a graduated system, judges 
would be encouraged to look beyond the immigration violation and consider 
surrounding circumstances such as the gravity of the conduct and potential 
consequences for the noncitizen.143 
Other scholars argue for a more nuanced immigration system that avoids 
the current “one-size-fits-all” model.144 In steering away from the binary mod-
el that often leads to exile from the country for relatively minor violations, 
these scholars stress the need to think more creatively about penalizing immi-
gration violators and modeling the immigration system on successful sanction 
schemes from other courts.145 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (listing offenses that qualify as aggravated felonies under the INA, 
which include murder, rape, and sexual abuse of a minor); id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (stating that “any 
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”); Nancy 
Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Pro-
posed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1939 (2000) (noting that under certain circumstances, shop-
lifting can be deemed an aggravated felony and therefore trigger deportation). 
 141 See Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring Proportion-
ality, and Imagining Graduated Sanctions, 30 J.L. & POL. 465, 488–93 (2015) (advocating for the 
“meaningful implementation of proportionality” into immigration statutes and for experimentation 
with “graduated sanctions” for immigration violations); Stumpf, supra note 117, at 1733–40 (propos-
ing the use of proportionate punishment for commission of immigration violations). 
 142 See, e.g., Stumpf, supra note 117, at 1732–33 (proposing a multi-factor analysis for immigra-
tion courts when considering punishments for immigration violations that accounts for: (1) the severi-
ty and details of the violation, (2) the government interest in imposing the sanction, (3) the harm done 
to the government, the noncitizen, and others as a result of the sanction, and (4) the noncitizen’s inter-
est in residing in the United States). Stumpf also argues that instead of ascribing an “on-off switch” to 
all immigration violations, the system should incorporate less severe consequences for less severe 
violations. See id. at 1737 (listing potential proportionate sanctions, including “restricting or delaying 
access to immigration benefits, imposing probation-like conditions or requiring community service, 
higher application fees for immigration benefits, or attending remedial courses on citizenship prepar-
edness”). 
 143 See id. at 1694 (explaining that under the current system, in determining deportability of a 
noncitizen, immigration judges look solely to whether he or she violated an immigration provision). 
 144 See, e.g., Kanstroom, supra note 141, at 491–92 (proposing an immigration sanctions model 
that is more “cost-effective, humane, and responsive to the legitimate goals” of immigration control 
compared to the current model). 
 145 See, e.g., id. at 490–92 (explaining how the immigration system could benefit by using con-
cepts from the “graduated sanctions” scheme implemented in the juvenile court system). Kanstroom 
suggests letting immigration judges partner with social service and probation networks to create alter-
native punishments for immigration violators that allow them to stay in the country. Id. Kanstroom 
also highlights international governmental bodies that allow deportation only after comparing the 
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Proportional sanctions may not be applicable in the context of the perse-
cutor bar, as the decision to apply the persecutor bar is ultimately a binary de-
cision.146 In determining whether to apply the persecutor bar, however, factors 
such as redemptive acts, the time elapsed since the applicant’s assistance or 
participation in persecution, and the various circumstances considered by 
scholars may provide guidance.147 
B. The Balancing Test 
As part of Congress’s attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of 
refugee in passing the Refugee Act of 1980, several categories of noncitizens 
were precluded from asylum eligibility, including those subject to the persecu-
tor bar.148 Congress’s purpose in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 was to 
bring U.S. domestic law in conformity with the internationally agreed upon 
standards set out in the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.149 Spe-
cifically, the persecutor bar mirrored Article 1(F)(a) of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol, which makes asylum protection unavailable to per-
sons who have “committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity.”150 Included in the definition of crimes against humanity is 
persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity.151 
Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol pro-
vides for another exclusion clause to persons who have committed a serious 
                                                                                                                           
state-interest against that of the applicant. See id. at 482 (noting that various international bodies, such 
as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, rec-
ognize that “deportation must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’”). 
 146 See generally ANKER, supra note 121, § 4:2 (providing an overview of the various bars to 
asylum, including the persecutor bar). 
 147 See supra notes 133–146 and accompanying text. 
 148 See Refugee Act of 1980 (stating that one of the purposes of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to 
“establish a more uniform basis for the provision of assistance to refugees” and specifying that the 
term refugee, as used in the INA, does not include any person who “ordered, incited, assisted, or oth-
erwise participated in” the persecution of others); see also Walls, supra note 44, at 231 (noting that by 
passing the Refugee Act of 1980, “Congress sought to provide a comprehensive, ideologically-neutral 
approach to defining ‘refugee’”). 
 149 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 520 (2009). 
 150 1951 Refugee Convention, art. 1(F)(a); see also Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 353 
(stating that the legislative history of the Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates that the language used in 
the Act “was based on . . . and is intended to be interpreted consistent with” the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and its 1967 Protocol); Matter of J.M. Alvarado, 27 I. & N. Dec. 27, 30 n.3 (B.I.A. 2017) 
(“[O]ne of Congress’ primary purposes in passing the Refugee Act was to implement the principles 
agreed to in the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . and the United 
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”). 
 151 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7(1)(h), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90, 93–94 (listing acts that qualify for a crime against humanity, one of which is “[p]ersecution against 
any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender . . . or 
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law”). 
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non-political crime.152 Guidelines set out by the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) urges countries, when applying Article 1(F)(b), 
to weigh the gravity of the applicant’s offense against the consequences to the 
applicant if excluded.153 The UNHCR suggests that in order to exclude a per-
son who has a credible fear of persecution, the character of the prior crime 
must outweigh their character as a “bona fide refugee.”154 Failure to conduct 
such a test, the UNHCR proposes, would be inconsistent with the purpose of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and its focus on global human rights.155 
Scholars note that by scrutinizing the circumstances of the crime and the 
culpability of the applicant, the exclusion clause better adheres to the policy of 
considering inclusion before exclusion.156 Other scholars take the concern for 
persecution one step further, arguing that if a person faces grave danger, he 
should not be excluded from asylum even if guilty of a truly serious non-
political crime.157 
While the UNHCR’s proposed balancing test speaks to a global audience, 
the effort has gained distinct footing in Europe.158 In 1996, the Council of the 
European Union specifically called for weighing the seriousness of the appli-
cant’s offense against the extent of the persecution the applicant faces when 
                                                                                                                           
 152 1951 Refugee Convention, art. 1(F)(b) (stating that the protections afforded to refugees under 
the 1951 Refugee Convention “shall not apply to any person . . . [who] has committed a serious non-
political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee”). 
 153 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the 
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 24, U.N. 
Doc. HCR/GIP/03/05 (2003) [hereinafter UNHCR Guidelines] (stating that the exclusion clauses, 
specifically Article 1(F)(b), must be applied proportionately to their humanitarian objective such that 
the “gravity of the offence in question is weighed against the consequences of exclusion” to the appli-
cant). 
 154 U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status, ¶ 156, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Engl.REV.1 (1979, rev. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR 
Handbook] (explaining that a crime must be sufficiently significant in order to exclude a person who 
has a “well-founded fear of persecution” in his home country). 
 155 UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 24 (noting that balancing the conduct of asylum applicants against the 
consequences of exclusion “ensure[s] that the exclusion clauses are applied in a manner consistent 
with the overriding humanitarian object and purpose of the 1951 Convention”). 
 156 See, e.g., GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
180–84 (3d ed. 2007) (arguing that the fundamental objectives of the 1951 Refugee Convention de-
mand a case-by-case consideration of asylum applicant claims); see also UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 31 
(stating that due to the potentially “grave consequences of exclusion[,] . . . a full factual and legal 
assessment” must be conducted for each applicant and that “inclusion should generally be considered 
before exclusion”). 
 157 See, e.g., ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 
(1966) (arguing that states should protect those who fear for their lives, despite their commission of a 
serious non-political crime, and that “the yardstick may be whether the persecutory measures seem far 
out of proportion to what would be a just punishment for the crime committed”). 
 158 See Akbar Rasulov, Criminals as Refugees: The “Balancing Exercise” and Article 1F(b) of 
the Refugee Convention, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 815, 826 (2002) (noting the presence of the “balancing 
test” within European Union documents). 
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applying Article 1(F)(b).159 Although the issuance is not binding on the Euro-
pean countries, it promotes policy consistent with the UNHCR’s proposal.160 
Furthermore, various courts around the world have incorporated a balanc-
ing test when applying exclusion clauses.161 In 1998, the Supreme Court of 
Canada acknowledged that Article 1(F)(b) contains a balancing mechanism 
that reflects a humanitarian concern to compare the applicant’s fear of persecu-
tion with the state’s concern in excluding criminals from admission.162 In Bel-
gium, the courts used a balancing test in three cases involving Ethiopian na-
tionals seeking asylum.163 After balancing the severity and likelihood of perse-
cution faced upon return to Ethiopia, however, the Belgian courts held that the 
applicants were still excluded under Article 1(F)(a).164 
Despite the UNHCR’s proposal, the balancing test has been all but reject-
ed in U.S. jurisprudence.165 In 1999, in INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, the U.S. Su-
preme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s application of a balancing test in 
which it considered the persecution the applicant could suffer upon return to 
                                                                                                                           
 159 O.J.C.E., Mar. 13, 1996, No. L63/2. As an “essential [European Union] decision-maker,” one 
of the tasks of the Council of the European Union is to develop the “European Union’s foreign and 
security policy.” The Council of the European Union, EUROPEAN COUNCIL (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/ [https://perma.cc/RGH3-CTGT]. 
 160 Rasulov, supra note 158, at 826; UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 24 (stating that in applying Article 
1F(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the “gravity of the offence in question” should be weighed 
against the potential consequences of exclusion faced by the applicant). 
 161 See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 156, at 180 (noting the global support for com-
paring the seriousness of an asylum applicant’s bad acts against his credible fear of persecution when 
applying Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention); see also Sibylle Kapferer, Exclusion 
Clauses in Europe—A Comparative Overview of State Practice in France, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom, 12 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 195, 217 (2000) (discussing three asylum cases in Belgium where 
the court, in deciding whether to exclude asylum seekers, balanced the applicants’ risk of persecution 
with the gravity of their conduct). 
 162 Pushpanathan v. Canada [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, ¶ 73 (Can.). 
 163 See Kapferer, supra note 161, at 217 (discussing three asylum cases in Belgium where the 
court was deciding whether to exclude asylum seekers under Article 1(F)(a) for their participation in 
human rights violations). In each of the asylum cases, the applicants had allegedly participated in 
human rights violations in Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam. Id. Soon after taking power in 
1974, Ethiopia’s former dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, began committing human rights abuses 
against political opponents. See Steve Bloomfield, Mengistu Found Guilty of Ethiopian Genocide, 
INDEPENDENT (Dec. 13, 2006), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/mengistu-found-
guilty-of-ethiopian-genocide-428233.html [https://perma.cc/JS6Y-KYCQ] (detailing how Mengistu 
Haile Mariam, the former Ethiopian dictator who murdered thousands of political opponents, was 
convicted of genocide). 
 164 See Kapferer, supra note 161, at 217 (detailing the balancing test employed by the Belgian 
courts in which they found that the applicants’ risk of persecution in Ethiopia was outweighed by “the 
gravity of [their] human rights violations committed voluntarily and systematically”). 
 165 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425–26 (1999) (finding that a crime shall not be 
mitigated by considering the persecution a noncitizen may face upon returning to his country of 
origin); Matter of Rodriguez-Coto, 19 I. & N. Dec. 208, 209 (B.I.A. 1985) (rejecting the notion that 
the interpretation of serious crimes varies with the nature of persecution faced by a noncitizen upon 
returning to his home country). 
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his native country.166 In that case, a Guatemalan national was entered into de-
portation proceedings for illegal entry into the United States.167 Simultaneous-
ly, the applicant applied for asylum and was found to have a credible fear on 
account of political persecution; however, his application was denied due to his 
participation in prior non-political crimes.168 Reading the statute literally, the 
Court found that a crime subject to an exclusion clause is not to be offset by 
considering the possibility that the applicant may face persecution if denied 
asylum.169 Though the Court acknowledged the UNHCR’s suggestion of bal-
ancing the persecution faced against the crime committed, it emphasized that 
the UNHCR Guidelines are not binding on U.S. courts.170 Reluctance to rec-
ognize a balancing test is not unique to the United States, as courts in other 
nations have rejected the test on similar grounds.171 
C. Distinguishing Between Forms of Persecution 
The Supreme Court in Fedorenko acknowledged the looming difficulty of 
identifying individual persecutors in cases less straightforward than a Nazi 
prison guard, yet equipped the lower courts with little guidance on how to do 
so.172 In its wake, courts are quick to bar those who have committed atrocities 
but pause when considering conduct that is less severe.173 Nevertheless, be-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See 526 U.S. at 425–26 (finding that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that the “BIA was 
required to balance [applicant’s] criminal acts against the risk of persecution he would face if returned 
to Guatemala”). 
 167 Id. at 421. 
 168 See id. at 418 (noting that the applicant was determined to have “burned buses, assaulted pas-
sengers, and vandalized and destroyed property in private shops”). U.S. immigration law parallels 
Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Refugee Convention by barring asylum seekers who “committed a serious 
nonpolitical crime outside the United States.” Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (excepting from 
asylum eligibility applicants for whom “there are serious reasons for believing that the alien has 
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the 
United States”), with 1951 Refugee Convention, art. 1(F)(b) (excepting from asylum eligibility appli-
cants who have “committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior to his 
admission to that country as a refugee”). 
 169 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 426. 
 170 See id. at 427–28 (noting that the UNHCR Handbook is not binding on the U.S. Attorney 
General, the BIA, or U.S. courts). 
 171 See Rasulov, supra note 158, at 827–33 (discussing the rejection of the balancing test in courts 
in the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand). 
 172 See 449 U.S. at 512 & n.34 (acknowledging that it may be more difficult to classify someone 
as a persecutor if presented with cases in between a prison barber and prison guard); Yanqin Weng, 
562 F.3d at 515 (recognizing the challenge avoided by the Supreme Court in Fedorenko by presenting 
the barber and prison guard example while avoiding “more difficult line-drawing problems”) (internal 
quotations omitted); Miranda Alvarado, 449 F.3d at 925–26 (identifying the Court’s guidance in de-
termining what amounts to assistance in persecution as “somewhat cryptic”). 
 173 See Yanqin Weng, 562 F.3d at 514 (noting that courts have routinely found “abhorrent con-
duct” to be grounds for barring asylum applicants yet have had difficulty in determining where to 
draw the line). 
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cause of the homogenous barring of all “persecutors” from asylum, coupled 
with the broad reach of the persecutor bar, even those on the margins of culpa-
bility—such as nurse’s assistants and drivers with minimal connections to 
China’s one-child policy—are deprived of their ability to seek safety in the 
United States.174 
Compared with other forms of persecution, China’s one-child policy is 
unique in that it has been deemed persecution per se by statute.175 Until enact-
ment of the IIRIRA, victims of forced abortions or sterilizations were not eli-
gible for asylum because courts found that the persecution was not of a type 
that fit into one of the five protected grounds.176 In 1989, in Matter of Chang, 
the BIA denied asylum to a Chinese man fleeing persecution on account of his 
violation of the one-child policy.177 The government threatened the applicant, 
who already had two children and refused to abide by the policy.178 Although it 
acknowledged China’s country-wide policy as a “profound dilemma,” the BIA 
held that so long as its purpose is only population control, the applicant’s fear 
of persecution does not fit within one of the five protected grounds of asy-
lum.179 Despite subsequent demands by the U.S. government for immigration 
officials to conduct a more favorable review of Chinese asylum seekers fleeing 
the one-child policy, the BIA continued to follow its precedent set in Chang in 
the following years.180 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See, e.g., Xing Jie Guan, 183 F. App’x at 77–78 (applying the persecutor bar to a hospital 
worker who played a “relatively minor” role in effectuating China’s one-child policy); Zhang Jian 
Xie, 434 F.3d at 143–44 (applying the persecutor bar to a driver who played an “arguably minor” role 
in effectuating China’s one-child policy). 
 175 See IIRIRA, § 601(a) (amending the definition of refugee in the INA by adding: “a person 
who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been 
persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive 
population control program, shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political opinion, 
and a person who has a well-founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or 
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of political opinion”); Walls, supra note 44, at 241 (describing the 
amendment specifying coercive population control programs as a category of persecution on account 
of political opinion as “odd in its specificity,” considering the term persecution is typically vague). 
 176 See IIRIRA, § 601(a) (amending the definition of refugee under the INA to include victims of 
coercive population control programs); Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 47 (B.I.A. 1989) (finding 
that a Chinese man who feared mandatory sterilization was not eligible for asylum because it was not 
persecution “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion”). 
 177 20 I. & N. Dec. at 47. 
 178 Id. at 39 (recounting that the government wanted to sterilize the applicant sterilized and had 
already scheduled the applicant’s wife for sterilization). 
 179 Id. at 44. 
 180 See Katherine L. Vaughns, Retooling the Refugee Definition: The New Immigration Reform 
Law’s Impact on United States Domestic Asylum Policy, 1 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 41, 51 (1998) 
(discussing the numerous attempts by President George H.W. Bush to require “enhanced considera-
tion” for asylum applicants fleeing their country due to fear of its policy of forced abortions or sterili-
zations); INS Sends Instructions on New Chinese Asylum Seekers Policy, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
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It is inarguable that the abhorrent treatment of women and families by the 
Chinese government in carrying out its policy constitutes persecution.181 When 
considering the massive population surge China was facing before implement-
ing the policy, however, it may have been reasonable for its citizens to believe 
that they ought to comply.182 Regardless of the applicants’ intentions, the prac-
tical effect of the law increases the number of otherwise bona fide refugees 
who are barred from seeking safety.183 
With World War II as the starting point in the evolution of asylum law and 
the persecutor bar, a stark contrast was presented between the persecutor—the 
Nazi—and the persecuted—the various victims of the Nazi regime.184 When 
considering the modern understanding of persecution, which encompasses an 
indefinite number of forms of persecution ranging from civil war atrocities to 
China’s one-child policy, this distinction is often less clear-cut.185 As the legal 
definition of persecutor evolves alongside changes to the broad definition of 
refugee, it becomes more attenuated from the prototypical Nazi guard.186 
                                                                                                                           
1056, 1056–58 (1994) (affirming that the BIA’s holding in Chang is recognized as precedent regard-
ing asylum applicants evading coercive population control programs). 
 181 See Guangcheng, supra note 90 (reporting that in enforcing the country’s one-child policy, 
Chinese authorities forced women out of hiding by kidnapping, imprisoning, and threatening their 
family members). Given the political conflict between the United States and China surrounding Chi-
na’s quashing of democratic movements in the late twentieth-century, commentators have suggested 
that the United States was “politically motivated” to declare coercive population control as a form of 
persecution on account of political opinion, rather than doing so out of genuine concern for human 
rights. See, e.g., Walls, supra note 44, at 241–47 (suggesting that the declaration that China’s one-
child policy is an obvious human rights violation is undercut by U.S. courts’ history of denying such 
asylum claims). 
 182 See Wang Feng et al., supra note 28, at 83 (suggesting that the one-child policy ended in Chi-
na “at least a decade later than it should have” partially due to the Chinese public’s fear that “un-
checked population growth” could lead to disastrous social and economic problems); Bernson, supra 
note 88 (noting that in the late 1970s, when China was facing food shortages and fearing a second 
famine from the previous decade, the Chinese government implemented its one-child policy and em-
phasized family planning). 
 183 See Matter of Rodriguez-Majano, 19 I. & N. Dec. 811, 816 (B.I.A. 1988) (noting that due to 
the persecutor bar’s reach, “[a]s the concept of what constitutes persecution expands, the group which 
is barred from seeking haven in this country also expands”). 
 184 See Walls, supra note 44, at 235–36 (describing the Nazi persecutor as “archetypal”); see also 
UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 2 (providing that the “rationale for the exclusion clauses . . . is that certain acts 
are so grave as to render their perpetrators undeserving of international protection as refugees”). 
 185 See Su Qing Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that be-
cause the statutory definition of persecution includes a coercive population control program, like Chi-
na’s one-child policy, a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum if he or she “ordered, incited, assisted, or 
otherwise participated” in the one-child policy); Figures at a Glance, UNHCR (June 19, 2018), https://
www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/D5W2-C9JJ] (reporting that 57% of the 
refugees worldwide come from South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria, all nations facing civil turmoil). 
 186 See Walls, supra note 44, at 236 (arguing that the rationale behind a persecutor bar does not 
map well to many modern contexts of persecution because the dichotomy between persecutor and 
persecuted is not as straightforward as it was with the Nazis and their victims). 
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III. PROPOSED BALANCING TEST 
The primary purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to conform U.S. 
asylum law with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.187 Both 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR Guidelines suggest reading the 
asylum exclusion clauses, such as the persecutor bar, to include a thumb on the 
scale of admitting those who have a legitimate fear of persecution.188 There-
fore, in order to apply the persecutor bar as intended, U.S. courts should take 
every precaution to ensure that they do not interfere with the fundamental right 
of all people to seek refuge from persecution.189 
By applying the persecutor bar to persons who have played marginal roles 
in effectuating persecution, the courts have expanded the reach of the bar far 
beyond its purpose of ensuring that those who have committed grave crimes 
against the international community are not afforded the same benefits as those 
fleeing persecution.190 Instead, bona fide refugees are denied asylum not be-
cause they have committed abhorrent and undesirable acts, but because courts 
are willing to draw the faintest of lines connecting them to the persecution of 
others.191 Furthermore, when analyzing the elements of the persecutor bar, the 
courts look solely to the objective effect of the applicant’s conduct, and there-
fore do not conduct a full assessment of the individual circumstances of each 
case.192 
To ensure a more appropriate interpretation of the persecutor bar, it is 
necessary to consider factors beyond the objective effect of the applicant’s 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (noting that the legislative history 
clearly indicates congressional intent to bring the definition of refugee under U.S. law to match the 
1967 Protocol). 
 188 See 1951 Refugee Convention, Preamble (stating that the United Nations has “manifested its 
profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
these fundamental rights and freedoms”); UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 31 (advising that “[t]he exceptional 
nature of [the exclusion clauses] suggests that inclusion should generally be considered before exclu-
sion”). 
 189 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 14 
at 74 (Dec. 10, 1948) (declaring the right to seek asylum as a universal human right). 
 190 See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 526–27 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 
the overarching consideration in determining admissibility of noncitizens is desirability); Yanqin 
Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 2009) (stating that the persecutor bar is easily applied to 
applicants who have committed “abhorrent conduct”). 
 191 See Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 929 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying the persecutor 
bar despite recognizing that the applicant acted at the “margin of culpability required under the stat-
ute”); Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that because the applicant 
played “an active and direct, if arguably minor, role” in persecution by driving the women to the hos-
pital where they would undergo forced abortions, his conduct triggered the persecutor bar). 
 192 See UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 2 (stating that “given the possible serious consequences of exclu-
sion, it is important to apply them with great caution and only after a full assessment of the individual 
circumstances of the case” and therefore, that the exclusion clauses should “always be interpreted in a 
restrictive manner”); see also supra notes 67–87 and accompanying text (discussing the objective test 
employed by the circuit courts when applying the persecutor bar). 
2020] Balancing the Persecutor Bar in U.S. Asylum Law 415 
conduct.193 The UNHCR proposes conducting a balancing test when consider-
ing whether to deny asylum to those who have committed a serious non-
political crime.194 The UNHCR further suggests that such a test would not 
normally be appropriate when assessing those who have persecuted others be-
cause the implicit wrongfulness of persecuting others can never be dimin-
ished.195 Its guidance, however, is directed towards heinous crimes against 
humanity, which may not include less egregious conduct such as transporting 
women to a hospital or even unwillingly performing prison guard duties.196 
When considering the expansive reach of the persecutor bar, therefore, it is 
reasonable to conduct a balancing test when assessing applicants who merely 
“assisted or otherwise participated” in the persecution of others.197 
Consistent with the balancing test for Article 1(F)(b), the proposed bal-
ancing test for the persecutor bar would begin by considering the persecution 
from which the applicant is fleeing.198 By considering the persecution feared 
by the applicant in his or her home country, the balancing test would align with 
the purpose of asylum law as creating a haven for those who cannot safely re-
turn to their home.199 
Courts should then consider the conduct itself, giving less weight to less 
egregious conduct.200 Using the concept of proportionality present throughout 
much of the U.S. legal system, courts must recognize that the denial of an asy-
                                                                                                                           
 193 See GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 156, at 180 (arguing that the circumstances of 
the crime, the culpability of the applicant, and an analysis of the persecution the applicant is fleeing 
from must be considered when applying the exclusion clauses). 
 194 See UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 24 (suggesting that in applying Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, the seriousness of the non-political crime must be “weighed against the consequences of 
exclusion” faced by the applicant). 
 195 See id. (clarifying that the balancing test suggested regarding Article 1(F)(b) would “not nor-
mally be required in the case of . . . crimes against humanity . . . as the acts covered are so heinous”); 
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 156, at 180 (stating that the UNHCR Guidelines suggest that 
the implicit gravity of offenses such as the persecution of others rules out the implementation of a 
balancing test). 
 196 See, e.g., Negusie, 555 U.S. at 515 (discussing how the applicant’s duties as a prison guard 
were performed under duress); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 143 (conceding that the applicant played a 
“minor role” in the persecution of others). 
 197 UNHCR Guidelines, ¶¶ 24, 31 (advising that “[t]he exceptional nature of [the exclusion claus-
es] suggests that inclusion should generally be considered before exclusion” and that “the exclusion 
clauses must . . . be applied in a manner proportionate to their objective”). 
 198 See UNHCR Handbook, ¶ 156 (explaining that a crime must be sufficiently grave to exclude a 
person who has a “well-founded fear” of persecution in his home country). 
 199 See Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 403 U.S. 49, 55–56 (1971) (noting that one of the goals of 
asylum law is to create “a haven for the world’s homeless people”). 
 200 See Stumpf, supra note 117, at 1736–37 (noting that while “seriously reprehensible conduct” 
may warrant deportation, the argument is substantially weakened for less egregious conduct). 
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lum claim despite a well-founded fear of persecution is a grossly excessive 
sanction for an individual whose contribution to persecution was minimal.201 
Additionally, courts should consider the nature of the persecution in 
which the applicant was involved with an understanding of the context of the 
persecution.202 For example, the worst perpetrators of persecution should not 
be equated with those employed as government automobile drivers that rarely 
assisted in carrying out China’s one-child policy.203 Finally, courts should con-
sider any mitigating factors such as the amount of time elapsed since the appli-
cant’s conduct and any substantial redemptive acts performed by the applicant, 
especially if they put him or her at risk in order to protect those who were per-
secuted.204 
Although currently stayed by former Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the 
recent decision by the BIA in Matter of Negusie I to allow for a duress defense 
was a step in the right direction.205 By conceding that an individual who com-
mitted persecutory acts out of fear of death or serious bodily injury to himself 
or others should not be barred from applying for asylum, the BIA poked a 
small hole in the airtight box of the persecutor bar.206 Beyond the acknowl-
edgement of a duress defense, however, is the need for a comprehensive bal-
ancing test that encompasses all of the circumstances surrounding an asylum 
applicant’s application.207 
In his concurring opinion in Negusie v. Holder, Justice Scalia posited an-
other reason for barring persecutors: that the persecutor “may end up living in 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See id. at 1688–91 (noting that whereas proportionality plays a large role in criminal, contract, 
and tort law, immigration violations can result in removal from the United States regardless of the 
gravity of the offense). 
 202 See Walls, supra note 44, at 245–47 (suggesting that doctors and others who participate in 
implementing China’s one-child policy are “less culpable” than Nazi prison guards). 
 203 See Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 137–38 (noting that as a state-employed driver, the applicant 
complied with orders to transport “as few as three and as many as five” women to the hospital where 
they would undergo forced abortions); see also UNHCR Guidelines, ¶ 2 (explaining that the rationale 
behind the exclusion clauses, including the persecutor bar, is to ensure that perpetrators of certain 
grave acts are “undeserving of international protection as refugees”); Walls, supra note 44, at 235–36 
(arguing that the persecutor bar, as initially developed to combat Nazi soldiers, does adapt to more 
recent forms of persecution such as participation in China’s one-child policy). 
 204 See Ofosu v. McElroy, 98 F.3d 694, 701 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting that redemptive acts could 
permit granting asylum to an applicant who previously assisted in the persecution of others, particular-
ly when the applicant “ultimately rejected the repressive activities in which he was involved, or put 
himself at risk in order to protect those who were persecuted”); Stumpf, supra note 133, at 1713–16 
(describing the reasons why U.S. immigration law incorporates measurements of time to determine 
whether a noncitizen is eligible for certain benefits). 
 205 See 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 363 (B.I.A. 2018) (allowing for a duress defense to the persecutor bar 
if the applicant meets five conditions); Matter of Negusie II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 481 (staying the BIA’s 
decision). 
 206 See Matter of Negusie I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363 (laying out a five-part test for a potential du-
ress defense). 
 207 See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
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the same community as one of his victims.”208 There is no doubt that such a 
scenario would be undesirable in the context of the stereotypical persecutor.209 
But would we have the same fear if Daniel Negusie happened to settle in the 
same neighborhood as an Ethiopian refugee?210 Would we worry that Zhang 
Jian Xie would harm a woman who had previously undergone a forced abor-
tion in China?211 When considering the substance and context of their conduct 
as well as any redemptive acts they undertook, it is hard to imagine any serious 
danger in the hypothetical offered by Justice Scalia.212 Furthermore, if we con-
sider Negusie and Xie’s fear of persecution in their home countries to be well-
founded, rejecting their applications undermines a fundamental purpose of in-
ternational asylum law.213 
CONCLUSION 
The persecutor bar is a legitimate and necessary part of the U.S. immigra-
tion laws that prevents those who are responsible for the persecution of others 
from receiving the protections of asylum. The language of the persecutor bar, 
however, casts a wide net that entraps not only those who have clearly and di-
rectly persecuted others, but also those who have played the most marginal of 
roles along the chain of events that led to the persecution. As a result, many 
persons fleeing persecution in their home countries are statutorily unable to 
seek refuge in the United States, and are thus denied a fundamental human 
right. 
This Note argues that courts should employ a balancing test when apply-
ing the persecutor bar. First, the courts should analyze the gravity of the appli-
cant’s conduct and weigh it against the persecution the applicant is fleeing. 
Next, the courts should evaluate the nature of persecution in which the appli-
                                                                                                                           
 208 See 555 U.S. at 526–27 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that granting asylum to noncitizens 
who persecuted others under duress may import “ethnic strife from remote parts of the world” if they 
happen to live in the same community as their victims). 
 209 See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 & n.34 (1981) (delineating between the 
Nazi prison guard, the prototypical persecutor, and a barber at the same prison). 
 210 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 515 (noting that the immigration judge determined that there is no 
evidence that Negusie was “a malicious person or that he was an aggressive person who mistreated the 
prisoners”). 
 211 See Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 138, 143 (describing the applicant’s assistance in helping a 
woman escape from before a forced abortion and noting that the applicant played an “arguably minor” 
role in the persecution). 
 212 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 526–27 (Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 515–16 (majority opinion) 
(describing the non-aggressive behavior by the applicant); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 143 (describ-
ing the applicant’s role in assisting in the persecution of others as minor).  
 213 See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 515–16 (demonstrating the applicant’s fear of being tortured if sent 
back to Eritrea); Zhang Jian Xie, 434 F.3d at 138 (describing the applicant’s fear of persecution on 
account of both his role in the student democratic movement and China’s coercive population control 
program); see also Rosenberg, 402 U.S. at 55 (noting that one of the goals of asylum law is to create 
“a haven for the world’s homeless people”). 
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cant assisted with the understanding that not all forms of persecution are alike. 
Finally, the courts should consider the distance between the applicant’s con-
duct and the time of seeking refuge as well as any of the applicant’s redemp-
tive acts, with a particular interest in whether such acts risked the applicant’s 
well-being in order to protect those who were persecuted. 
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